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OPPORTUNITY 
I  would  like  to  devote  this  first Jean  Monnet  Lecture, 
_,  I 
in this  twentieth  anniversary year  of  the  Community,  to  a 
single major  issue,  but  one  which  in  its  ramifications  touches 
every  aspect  of European  life.  Th~  h~rd,  central  core  of 
the  argument  I  shall  develop  turns  around  the  case  for 
monetary  union.  This,  of  course,is  a  familiar,  rather  than  a 
novel  concept.  Despite  its familiarity,  it is  neither popular 
nor well  understood.  But  even  for  those  for  whom  it is 
part  of  the  normal  landscape  of  ecoJlomic  theory  and  policy, 
what  is very different  compared  to  the  last  time  the 
Community  discussed  the  subject  in  any  basic  way  is  the 
state of  the  European  and  world  economy,  and  the  state of 
international monetary  affairs.  ~e nepd _  al,so  to  take  a 
fresh  view  as  to  how  monetary  union  should  be  allied with 
associated  Community  policies,  and,  mote-broadly,  with  the 
~-. 
fundamental  question  as  to  how  such.~~ idea  as  monetary 
'  "  .. 
union  fits  with  our  view  of  the  future  division  of 
functions  between  the  Community  and  Member  States. 
This  choice  of subject  does  not  imply  a  narrow  economic 
view  of  the  Community's  function.  It  d~rives  from  the  obvious 
fact  that  the  most  important  weakness  of  the  Community  today  is  its 
central  economic  mechanism.  Of  course  the  Community  has  other 
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primary  functions.  On  the  one  hand  it stands  for  a  certain 
type  of democratic  and  political  society within  Europe;  on 
the  other  hand  it stands  as  a  viable  political entity for 
dealing with  a  wide  range  of external  relations. 
On  these  two  fronts,  much  remains  to  be  done.  But 
despite  the  shocks  and di fficu  1 ties of  the  recent  past, 
the  outlook  is  one  of activity  and  promise.  We  are  engaged 
in  underpinning  our  democratic  political values,  not  only 
in preparing  the  first direct  elections  to  a  new  European 
Parliament,  but  at  the  same  time  confronting  sympathetically 
but  realistically the  potential  adhesion  of  three  new 
Member  States  - three  states  which  have  recently made  the 
historic shift  from  military dictatorship  to  parliamentary 
democracy.  We  have  in  the  last  fortnight  seen  a  great 
European  nation  combat  with  resiliance  and  skill  a  major 
terrorist  threat  to  individual  freedom  and  the  rule  of 
law  - those  fundamental  values  for  the  strengthening  of  .. 
which  the  applicants  have  turned  to  Europe  for  sustenance. 
In  the  world  beyond,  the  Community  has  a  solid 
record:  the  Lorn€  Convention,  the  Mediterranean  agreements, 
and  our  response  to  the  North/South  dialogue.  During  the 
past  six months,  the  Community  has  continued  to  move  forward 
at  the  centre  of  major  world  negotiations.  Indeed,  such 
has  been  the  advance  that  we  face  the  somewhat  paradoxical 
spectacle  of  Europe  being  taken  more  seriously  from  outside 
than  from  within.  It  is  a paradox which,  in  my  view,  we 
cannot  indefinitely sustain.  Our  size  as  a  trading  bloc 
conceals,  rather  than  heals,  our  divisions  and 
inequalities  in  the  realm  of 
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economic  performance.  This  cannot persist.  The  central 
economic  weaknesses  of Europe,  if they continue,  will  not 
allow our  external cohesion to  grow,  or  even  ~erhaps be 
maintained.  Moreover,  the  prospect  of  enlargement will 
face  us  with  the clear choice  either of  a  strengthening 
of  the  sinews  of  the  Community  or  of tacit  acceptance  of 
a  loose  Customs  Union,  far  removed  from  the  hopes  of  its 
founders,  and without  much  hope  of recovering  momentum. 
Some  commentators  believe  the  time  is unpropitious 
for  adventurous  ideas.  I  do  not  agree.  The  concept  ahd 
indeed  the politics  of  monetary  union  stand  immobilised  in 
scepticism,  following  the  demise  of the  Werner  Plan,  whose 
initial  exchange  rate mechanism  was  shattered by  the 
turbulent  monetary  events  of  the past  few  years. 
The  consequence  has  been  an  understandable  shift of 
emphasis.  The  concept  of  gradualism,  which  has  been  more 
imperceptible  than  inevitable,  has  come  to  supplant  more 
ambitious  schemes.  Some  people  seem  to believe that  we 
can  back  our  way into monetary. union;  others  that 'better 
coordination is all that  is  required.  I  am  afraid neither 
view  is right.  The  last  few  years  have  seen  a  retreat 
rather  than  an  advance.  In  any  event,  the  idea  of  an 
antithesis  between  gradual  evolution  and  dramatic  advance 
is misconceived.  Evolution  is  a  process  which  once  begun 
goes  both  gradually  and  in  jumps.  There  is  room  for 
tomorrow's  act  of better coordination  and  for  todav's 
discussion of a  more  ambitious  plan for  the  dav after 
tomorrow.  The  process  has  to  be  seen  as  one.  Examples 
are  the  Community's  role  in helping  to  restructure basic 
industries  that  are  at present  in  deep  economic  difficulty, 
and measures  to abolish  the  remaining  effective frontiers 
to  the  free  movement  of  goods  and  services. 
We  must  now  look  afresh  at  the  case  for  monetary 
union  because  there  are  new  arguments,  new  needs,  and  ne'v 
approaches  to  be  assessed,  which  go  to  the  heart  of  o~r 
present  apparently intractable problems  of  unemployment, 
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inflation and  international  financing.  There  are  no  less 
than  seven  arguments  that  I  would  like to  put  forward  for 
your  consideration.  The  first  and  the  seventh are classical, 
but  none  the  less valid for that.  The  remaining  five, 
however,  are all practical points  that  need  to  be  formulated 
differently from  the  way  in which  they  were  presented  in 
the early nineteen seventies. 
Basic  to  the case  is the  ineluctable  internationalisation 
of western  economic  life.  This  has  been  a  long  and  gradual 
process,  but  one  which  has  been  unmatched  by  a  comparable 
evolution  in  the  economic  institutions of the  Community. 
The  past  four  years  has  shown  the  limitations  in  Europe  even 
of  good  national  economic  policies.  This  has  been  suner-
imposed  on  the  revolutionary effect  of  the oil crisis  - that 
sharp  confirmation of  the  end  of  the  old  international 
monetary  order  which  added  the  hazard  of  a  massive  overhang 
of maldistributed  and  largely uncontrolled  iriternationnl 
liquidity to  an  already vulnerable  European  economy. 
No  proposition as  radical  as  monetary union  in 
Europe  can  be  achieved  at  a  stroke.  ~1y  be 1 ief is that we 
should  use  the period  immediately prior to  the first 
direct elections  of  the  European  Parliament  to  re-launch a 
major  public  debate  on  what  monetary  union  has  to offer. 
In  doing  so,  we  have  to reckon with  the  problems  of  how  to 
get  from  where  we  are  to  where  we  want  to  go  and  what  must 
necessarily accompany  monetary  union  if it  is  to  a~neal 
equally  to  strong  and  weak  economies,  to  the  richer  and 
poorer  narts  of  the  Community. 
I  wish  today  to  outline  the  major  criteria by  which 
the  case  has  to  be  judged.  I  expect  no  easy consensus  on 
the  problems  it raises,  several  of  which  are  either at  the 
heart  of what  is most  controversial  in  modern  economic 
theory,  or  the  most  debatable  - in  the  best  sense  - in 
political  terms.  The  debate  must  now  be  re-opened  and 
subsequently  sustained.  It will  not  be  quickly  foreclosed. 
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The  first  argument  is that  monetary  union  favours  a 
more  efficient and  developed  rationalisation of industry and 
commerce  than  is possible under  a  Customs  Union  alone.  This 
argument  is  as  valid now  as  it has  always  been,  and  is 
reflected  in the  repeated  attempts  in  European history to 
form  monetary  unions  - for  example  the  Austro-German 
monetary  union  of  1857,  the  Latin monetary  union  led  by 
France  in  1865,  and  the  Scandinavian  union  of  1873.  Some-
what  later sterling  o~erated a  different  kind  of  imperial 
monetary union  over  large  and  disparate parts of the  globe. 
But  that  is history,  although  relatively recent  history. 
To  return to  the present  day,  discussion with  businessmen 
across  Europe  produces  a  clear  and  consistent  complaint 
that it is difficult,  almost  impossible,  to plan  a  rational 
European  dimension  to their enterprises with  the  present 
exchange  rate  risks  and  inflation uncertainties  as  between 
Nember  States.  The  same  comnlaint  is  often  heard  from  those 
outside  who  wish  to  increase  their  investment  in  and  trade 
with  Europe.  This  means  that  the notential  benefits  of 
the  Community  as  a  common  market  are  far  from  fully  achieved. 
The  second  argument  is  based  on  the  advantages  of 
creating  a  major  new  international  currency  ba~ked by  the 
economic  spread  and  strength of  the  Community,  which  would 
be  comparable  to  that  of  the  United  States,  were  it not  for 
our  monetary divisions  and  differences.  The  benefits  of  a 
European  curr~ncy,  as  a  joint  and  alternative pillar of 
the  world  monetary  system,  would  be  great,  and  made  still 
more  necessary by  the current  problems  of  the dollar,  with 
its possible de-stabilizing effects.  By  such  a  develorment 
the  Community  would  be  relieved of many  short-run balance 
of  payments  preoccupations.  It  could  live  through  patches 
of unfavourable  trading  results with  a  few  points  drop 
in  the  exchange  rate  and  in relative  equanimity.  Inter-
national  capital would  be  more  stable because  there  were 
fewer  exchange  risks  to  play on,  and  Europe  would 
stand  to  gain  through  being  the  issuer of  a  world 
currency.  National  balance  of  payments  problems,  in 
the  sense  that  these  are  experienced  today  by  the 
Community's  Member  States,  would  be  largely removed  as 
an  immediate  constraint  on  economic  management.  There 
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would  still be  major  financial  questions  to  be  resolved, 
between  regions,  and  between  Member  States,  and  to  these  I 
will  return  in a  moment;  but  the  essential  point  is that 
economic  welfare  in  Europe  would  be  improved  substantially if 
macro-economic  policy was  not  subject  to  present  exchange  rate 
and  external  financial  risks.  They  hang  as  a  sword  of 
Damocles  over  the  heads  of many  of our  countries  in 
Europe  today. 
It will rightly be  argued  at  this point  that  sound 
financial  policies  are  in  any  case  necessary  for  all 
countries  and  that  we  cannot  escape  from  the  need  for 
certain universal  disciplines  by  relocating  the  level 
of certain economic  policy powers.  I  myself  advocate 
prudent  financial  policies,  and  indeed  was  accused  in  the 
past  as  a  British Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  of  that  most 
terrible of sins  - excessive  prudence.  But  this  is not  an 
argument  counter  to  my  main  thesis.  The  relevant  question 
is what  degree  of reward  will  the  public  receive  as  a  result 
of wise  and  even  courageous  nolicies  on  the nart  of its 
governments;  or,  put  another  way,  what  will  be  the 
penalties  inflicted on  our  people  by  a  largely  anonymous 
international monetary  system which  amplifies  beyond  all 
proportion  any  ill-fortune of  a  political or  economic  nature. 
My  argument  is  that  it is within  our.power  to  change, 
profoundly  and  to  our  advantage,  the  scale of  rewards  and 
retribution~ administered  by  the  world  monetary disorder. 
We  should  take  it upon  ourselves  to  redesign  and  restote 
a  large  pary of that  system.  In  the  Community  we  have 
the  nolitical  framework  within which  a  workable  alternative 
•  could  be  achieved  if we  so  wish,  and  if we  have  the will. 
The  Community  is  the  right  size of unit  for  monetary  policy 
in  the particular setting of  our  highly  interdenendent, 
closely packed,  advanced  industrialised societies.  At 
the  world  level  or  inter-continental  level  there  is 
probably  no  real alternative  to  floating  exchanr,e  rates; 
nor  indeed  is  this  system  such  a  bad  one  in  that  very 
different  context  where  the  units  of  economic  management 
are  widely separated  by  distance,  or  society,  or rolitical 
system,  or  living  standards,  or  several  of  these  factors 
together. 
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My  third  argument  concerns  inflation.  It is fairly 
certain that  monetary  union  would  radically change  the rresent 
landscape  by  leading  to  a  common  rate of price movement. 
But  I  would  also  like  to  argue,  although  I  accept  this 
to be  more  controversial,  that monetary  union  could 
help  establish a  new  era of nrice  stability in  Europe  and 
achieve  a  decisive  break with  the  present  chronic 'inflationary 
disorder.  Of  course  the  sources  of  contemporary  inflation 
are diverse,  and  prominent  amont  these  are  what  may  seem 
to  be  essentially domestic  and  highly political  struggles 
over  income  distribution.  But  let  us  suppose  at  some 
stage  a  currency  reform:  the  issue  of  a  new  single 
currency  by  a  European  monetary  authority;  and  adoption 
by  this authority of  a  determined  and  relatively 
independent  policy of controlling note  issue  and  bank 
money  creation.  The  authority would  start  by  adopting 
target  rates  of  growth  of monetary  expansion  consistent 
with  a  new  European  standard  of monetary stability, 
following  the best  traditions  of  our  least  inflationary 
Member  States.  This  would  of course  mean  that national 
governments  lost  some  considerable  control  over  some 
aspects  of  macro-economic  policy.  But  governments 
which  do  not  discipline  themselves  already  find  themselves 
accepting very  sharp  surveillance  from  the  International 
Monetary  Fund,  a  body  far  further  away  from  them  and  less 
susceptible  to  their  individual  views  than  is  the  Community. 
Furthermore,  I  must  make  it clear that  my  arguments  are not 
addressed  to  those  who  would  prefer to  fail  alone  rather  than 
succeed  together.  Attitdues  such  as  theirs  inevitably 
cause  deaf ears.  I  am  concerned with  those  who  want  to 
see  a  successful  and  strengthened  Community,  but  also 
exnect  to  be  convinced  of  the  practical  benefits  of any 
move  forward. 
We  have  to  remember  what  is  new  about  the  problem  of 
inflation compared  with that  to  which  we  were  accustomed 
in  the  fifties  and  sixties.  Floating  exchange  rates 
transmit violent  and  sudden  inflationary  impulses,  which 
may  strike  a  country at  any  moment,  perhaps  just at  the 
time  when  employers,  trade  unions  and  government  may  be 
endeavouring  to  put  or  hold  together  a  courageous  and 
delicate  stabilisation programme. 
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Each  new  impulse  ratchets  up  the  inflationary process. 
The  price rise effect  on  the devaluing  country is  much  more 
than  the price reduction effect  on  the  revaluing  currency 
because  wages,  and  therefore  a  large part  of costs, 
cannot  be  reduced  in nominal  terms. 
Exchange  rates  may  rise  and  fall,  but  the price  level 
in all recent  experience  only goes  up.  The  exchange  rate 
problem  feeds  in turn  the  psychology  of  inflation  - the 
high  level  of  inflationary  .e~pectations now  endemic  in many 
of ·our  own  countries,  leading  to  the  danger,  only recently 
averted  in  some  Member  States,  of hyperinflation  - that 
condition in which,  almost  in the  time  it  takes  to  walk 
from  bank  to  shop,  the  product  you  planned  to  buy  has 
become  too  expensive.  Of  course,  there  are  conventional 
responses  for  trying to  contain and  reduce  the pressures 
of  inflation.  But  monetary  union  and  reform  stands  available 
as  the  radical  treatment  for  this  disease.  I  do  not  pretend  that 
the  cure  would  be  complete.  For  example,  we  would  still have 
to  reckon with  the  inflationary effects of reconciling  competing 
claims  on  limited resources.  The  disciplines  of  monetary 
union will  be  more,  not  less  demanding.  The  change  in 
inflationary behaviour  would  not  have  to  be  greater  than 
that  observed  in  some  recent  stabilisation policies,  but  it 
l-.'ould  have  to  be  permanent.  The  legitimate  needs  o,f  U\e  weaker 
regions  would  have  to  be  met  far  more  powerfully  than  is  at 
present  the  case·  I  wi 11  return  to  this  point  in  a  moJllen t .. 
But  the  counterpart  must  be  that wages  across  countrie$  would 
remain  in  some  kind  of reasonable  relationship  to productivity: 
here  the  legitimate  concern  of the  stronger  regions  and  less 
inflationary states would  also  have  to  be  met. 
The  fourth  argument  concerns  employment  :  no  medium  term 
recine  for  reducing  inflation which  does  not  have  a  beneficial 
effect  upon  employment  is  now  acceptable.  Present  levels 
of  unemployment  are  the  most  damaging  and  dangerous  social 
ill that  confront  us.  At  best  they produce  a  self-
defeating  nationalistic caution  and  immobilism.  At 
worst  they  threaten the  stability of  our  social  and  political 
svstems.  We  now  have  six million  unemployed  in  the  Community.  .  . Many  have  been  surprised at  the  apparent  tolerance of our 
populations  to  this  level.  Typically  in  our  larger 
Member  States  the  level  of  one  million unemployed  long 
figures  as  some  kind  of post-war political barrier. 
The  unthinkable  has  been  surpassed without  catastrophe  -
as  yet.  But  no-one  should  be  so  complacent  as  to  sup~ose 
that  this state  of affairs  can  long  persist without  doing 
irreparable  damage:  to  the  well-being of  the millions  of 
families  directly affected  by  unemployment,  to  the  morale 
and  motivation of a  whole  generation of  young  people,  to 
stability and  consensus  in our  societies. 
In  economic  terms,  I  believe that  our  unemployment 
problem  is essentially one  of demand  deficiency  stemming 
from  the constraints  on  our ability to  cause  a  smooth, 
powerful,  sustained  ground-swell  of  demand.  I  do  not 
accept  that  Europe's  capacity for  creating  new  wealth, 
providing  new  employment  and  stimulating  growth  in  the 
right  direction  is  at  an  end.  Environmental  factors  and 
the  energy crisis mean  that  we  have  to  look  at  the  nature 
of our  growth.  In  any  event  we  need  increased output  to 
pay  for  the  present  price of oil  and  for  the  replacement 
or  adaptation of  industrial processes  that  were  designed  for 
lower  energy prices  and  lower  environmental  standards. 
These  structural  and  monetary  problems  combine  to 
make  present  levels  of  unemployment  highly  intractable. 
But  they  should  not  be  seen  as  justifying de  .. featist  and 
misconceived  policies  which would  permanently  reduce  the 
economic  potential  of the  European  economy:  for  exam~le 
excessive  reduction  in working  hours  or  compulsory 
retirement  at  55. 
We  also  need  to view  the  present  economic  rece~sion in  a 
longer-term perspective.  The  extent  and  persistence of 
unemployment  can  no  longer  be  seen  as  an  exceptionally  low 
and  long  bottom  to  the  business  cycle.  To  restore  full 
employment  requires  a  new  impulse  on  a  historic scale.  We 
require  a  new  driving  force  comnarable  with  the  major 
rejuv~nations of the  past  two  hundred  years;  the  indUstrial 
revolution  itself,  the  onset  of  the  railway  age,  the  impact 
of  Keynes,  the  need  for  nost-war  reconstruction,  the 
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spread of what  were  previously regarded  as  middle-class 
standards  to  the  mass  of  the  population  in the  industrial 
countries.  I  believe that the  needs  of  the  Third  World 
have  a  major  part  to play here.  Two  sources  of new 
growth  have  in  the  past  sometimes  come  together,  the  one 
world-wide,  and  the  other regional. 
Can  we  contemplate  the prospect  of European  monetary 
union  in this  context  ?  I  believe  that  we  can  and  should. 
There  is  already broad  agreement  on  what  we  need  for 
a  fundamental  turn  in  the  tide of Europe's  emnloyment 
prospects  : 
- there  has  to  be  confidence  in steady  and  more 
uniform  economic  policies  favouring  investment 
and  expansion; 
- there  has  to  be  a  strengthening  of  demand  with 
a  wide  geographical  base; 
- if inflation is  to continue,  it must  be  at 
a  lower  and  more  even  rate  than  Europe  has  known 
in recent  years; 
- we  have  to  ensure  that  spasmodic,  local  economic 
difficulties will not  be  magnified  by  exchange 
rates  and  capital  movements  into  general  crises 
of  confidence. 
These  four  requirements  may  seem  obvious  enough.  The 
challenge  is  how  to  change  radically  and  for  the better the 
institutional weaknesses  that  have  been  hindering our  ability to 
restore  high  employment  in conditions  of price stability and 
a  sound  external  payments  position.  I  believe  that  monetary 
union  can  open  ~erspectives of  this  kind. 
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My  argument  is not  that  the  Community  ought  to make 
some  new  choice  on  the  combination of these  three objectives, 
still less  that  we  should  seek  to  impose  a  caricature of 
some  country's  traditional preference  on  the  rest  of  the 
Community.  Economists  have  now  spent  years  tracking  the 
deteriorating  inflation - employment  relationship  and 
the  deteriorating effectiveness  of  exchange  rate ·changes 
in the  balance  of payments  adjustment  process.  The 
decisions  now  required  are.~olitical rather  than  simply 
economic;  and  I  hope  that  these  would  in years  ahead 
come  to  be  recognised  by  economists  as  a  break-out  from 
their accepted  systems  and  current  models.  In  this 
process,  we  need  also  to  discard political  argument  based 
on  obsolete,  inadequate,  or  irrelevant  economic  theory 
that  the  objections  to  European  integration are  the 
differing preferences  on  inflation  and  unemnloyment 
as  between Member  States,  and  that  floating  exchange 
rates within Europe  allow  each  country  to  achieve  on  its 
own  a  happily  optimal  outcome  of its  own  preference.  This 
is not  how  the  world  really is,  and  we  all  know  it. 
The  fifth  argument  to which  I  now  turn  concerns 
the regional  distribution of  employment  and  economic 
welfare  in Europe.  Monetary  union will  not  of itself 
act  as~  some  invisible  hand  to  ensure  a  smooth  regional 
distribution of the  gains  from  increased  economic 
integration and  union.  Those  who  have  criticised a 
purely  liberal model  of  the  Community  economy,  one 
that  aims  to  establish perfect  competition  and  do  no 
more,  have  strong  arguments  on  their side. 
But  the Community  of  today bears  no  relation to 
the  laissez-faire caricature of  some  of  its critics. 
Nor  does  it correspond  to  the  model  I  suggest  we  should 
now  contemplate  for  a  monetary  union.  All  our  Member 
States  find  themselves  obliged  to  redistribute  large  sums 
of public  money  and  to  use  less  strong but  more  overt 
regional  policy measures  to  secure  a  reasonable distribution 
of national  wealth  and  emnloyment. 
I  In  the  Community - I t.  -
In  the Community  of today,  we  have  a  battery of financial 
instruments,  but  all of  them  rather  small  guns  :  the  Regional 
and  Social  Funds,  the  Coal  and  Steel  Community's  financial 
powers,  the  European  Investment  Bank  and  the  Guidance  Section 
of  the Agricultural  Fund.  The  Commission  has  recently 
made  a  number  of decisions  and  proposals  for  the  coordination 
and  expansion of these  operations.  These  are worthwhile 
developments  in themselves,  and  they  go  in  the  right 
direction.  But  their scale  is small  in  relation both  to 
current  needs  and  to  the  financial  underpinning  that  would 
be  required  to  support  a  full  monetary  union.  This  is  an 
example  of how  short-term practical  needs  and  the  demands 
of  a  longer-term perspective  march  alongside  each  othet. 
There  is  no  contradiction in modern  integrated  economies. 
The  flow  of public  finance  between  regions  performs 
several  essential  functions 
- first it  improves  the  infrastructure  and  promotes 
industrial  investment  in the  poorer  areas; 
second,  it evens  out cyclical  swings  in the 
performance  of  individual  regions; 
third,  it assures  minimum  standards  in basic 
services; 
- fourth,  it sustains  a  pattern of regional 
balance  of  payments  surpluses  and  deficits 
which  are  of  a  different  and  larger order 
of magnitude  than  those  which  would  cause 
crises if they  existed  between  countries. 
This  represents  the principal  offsetting factor 
compensating  the  region  or  state for  its inability to 
conduct  a  distinct  exchange  rate or monetary policy. 
Europe  must  think  in  terms  of the  same  economic 
logic.  If the  Community  is  to  take  seriously its declared 
aim  of monetary  union  - and  there  are  great  dangers  in 
having  declared  aims  which  are  not  taken  seriously  - it 
is  indispensable  that  an  associated  system  of public 
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finance  should  also  be  envisaged.  The  weak  regions  of 
the  Community  must  have  a  convincing  insurance  against 
the  fear  that  monetary  union would  aggravate  their 
economic  difficulties.  The  strong  regions  must  for  their 
part  have  a  counterpart  in terms  of more  stable,  secure 
and  prosperous  markets.  Their  interest  in the under-
pinning  of the unity of  the  market  is  overwhelming. 
In  the  context  of  the  enlarged  Community,  it should  also 
be  made  clear that we  are  here  talking  of  the  means  whereby 
we  can  avoid  or  reduce  excessive  movement  of people  from 
poorer  to  richer  areas.  This  could all too  easily lead 
to  the  further  impoverishment  of one  and  the  intolerable 
congestion of the  other. 
The  Community  must  also  take  a  realistic view  of 
the  degree  of convergence  in  economic  performance  which 
should  be  expected before  and  after  the  creation of  a 
monetary  union.  On  price performance,  monetary  ~nion 
has  uncompromising  effects.  Inter-regional  differences 
in living  standards  cannot  be  dealt with  so  drastically. 
But  we  should  not  be  too  discouraged.  The  United  States 
of  SO  years  ago  had  a  greater  degree  of regional  inequality 
than  the  Community  has  today.  100  years  ago  it was  almost 
certainly greater still.  This  analogy  should not  be 
pushed  too  far,  but  it is nonetheless  of  considerable 
interest. 
The·  sixth  argument  concerns  institutional questions, 
the  level  at  which  decisions  have  to  be  made,  or  the 
degree  of decentralisation that we  should  seek to maintain 
in the  Community.  "Monetary  union would  imply  a  major 
new  authority to manage  the  exchange  rate,  external 
reserves  and  the  main  lines  of  internal monetary  policy. 
The  public  finance  underpinning  of monetary  union 
which  I  have  just described  would  involve  a  substantial 
increase  in  the  transfer  of resources  through  the 
Community  institutions.  The  question  then  is  :  can 
monetary  union be  reconciled with  the  profound nressures 
that are manifest  in almost  all our  Hember  States  in  favour 
of  ~ore, rather than  less,  decentralised  government  ?  I 
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believe the  answer  can  and  should  be  yes.  But  this 
requires  us  to  envisage  a  very  special  and  original 
model  for  the future  division of  functions  between 
levels  of government.  This  is not  a  subject  that 
has  been  considered  at  all  systematically  in the 
Community  in  the  two  decades  which  have  nassed  since the 
Treaties  of Paris  and  Rome  laid down  certain sectors 
of  Community  competence.  Monetary  policy can  only be 
decentralised  to  a  very  limited degree.  But  for  @OSt 
policies  requiring public  expenditure,  the  reverse 
is  the  case.  The  vast  growth  of public  expenditure 
in  the  ~ost-war period,  now  approaching  half of  GNP, 
has  emphasised  the  need  for  multi-tiered government 
with  various  levels  according  to  country  :  local, 
regional,  state,  national,  etc.  This  is  a  natural 
and  healthy development.  It  avoids  a  monolithic 
concentration of political  and  economic  power  and  allows 
for  more  efficient specialisation by  level  of  government. 
It also  associates  people more  closely with  the decision-
making  process. 
The  federal  model  is clearly only  one  in  a  number 
of possibilities  for  multi-tiered  government.  Some 
support  the  federal  model;  others  would  prefer something 
confederal;  others  like neither.  I  for  my  part  believe 
that  the  Community  must  devise  its own  arrangements  and  that 
these  are  unlikely  to  correspond  to  any  existing prototype. 
We  must  build  Europe  unon  the basis  of our  late  twentieth 
century nation states.  We  must  only give  to  the 
Community  functions  which will,  beyond  reasonable  doubt, 
deliver significantly better results  because  they  are 
performed  at  a  Community  level.  We  must  fashion  a 
Co:mmuni ty which  gives  to  each  Member  State  the benefit:. 
of results  which  they  cannot  achieve  alone.  We  must  equally 
leave  to  them  functions  which  they  can  do  equally well  or 
better on  their  own. 
I  would  like to  give  an  example  of why  Europe  should 
not  think  in  terms  of  co~ying existing models.  The  U.S. 
Federal  Government  grew  enormously  in  importance  when  it 
pushed  the  development  of  the  social  security system, 
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because  the  states would  not  move  forward  quickly enough, 
and  because  some  states were  notable  laggards.  By  contrast, 
our  national  social  and  welfare  services,  while  neither 
perfect  nor  identical,  are  highly developed  and  not 
dissimilar.  In  most  Member  States  social  and welfare 
expenditure  amounts  to  around  25%  of  GNP.  This  is  a 
massive  example  of  how  the  European  model  of government 
has  no  need  to  contemplate  developing  Community  expenditure 
of a  traditional  federal  scale. 
I  believe that  we  can  identify those  functions  which 
make  sense  for  Europe  :  those  aspects  of  external  relations 
where  inter-continental bargaining  power  is called for; 
certain research  and  development  functions  which  offer  economies 
of scale at  the  level  of  250  million people;  policies  relating 
to  industrial sectors which  have  a  natural  European  dimension 
either  because  they  involve  high-level  economies  of  scale 
as  in the  case  of  aerospace  or  electronics;  or  because  they are 
closely linked with  trade  policy,  as  is  the case  with  industries 
in  trouble with  excess  capacity  like  steel,  textiles  and 
shi~-building;  or  because  the  areas  involve  strategic 
interests  which  are  indivisible  between Member  States,  as 
in  the  case  of  energy policy.  Last  we  need  financial 
policies  that  would  help  sunport  the  integration of  the 
European  economy,  the  maintenance  of  regional  balance,  and 
thus  the viability of monetary  union. 
The  oVerall  magnitude  of  budgetary  spending  at  the 
European  level  for  this  type  of Community  has  recently 
been  estimated by  a  group  of  independent  economists 
under  the  chairmanship  of Sir Donald  McDougall.  As 
against present  Community  expenditure  of  the  order  of 
1%  of  GNP,  they  estimated  that  very  substantial progress 
on  economic  integration could  be  achieved  with  the  aid 
of expenditure  of  2  to  2~%  of  GNP;  they  believed  that 
a  definitive monetary  union  might  be  viable with 
ex~enditure of the  order of  5  to  7%  GNP.  These  are 
of course  very  large  sums  of money,  which  would  have  to 
be  built  up  gradually  by  a  transfer of  some  expenditure 
from  national  budgets  and  not  by  a  superimposition,  but  they 
are  quite  small  by  the  standards  of  the classic  federations 
where  the  top tier of  government  takes  20  to  25%  of  GNP. 
I  There  is - lb  -
There  is therefore  for  the  Community  a  new  and 
realistic model  for  a  highly decentralised  type  of monetary 
union  in which  the public procurement  of  goods  and  services  is 
primarily in national,  regional  or  other hands.  The  public 
finance  function  of  such  a  Community  would  be  stripped 
down  to  a  few  high-powered  types  of  financial  transfer, 
fulfilling specific  tasks  in sectors  of particular 
Community  concern,  and  assuring  the  flow  of  resources  necessary 
to  sustain monetary  union.  These  characteristics  also  make 
for  a  quite  small  central bureaucracy,  which  I  think  we 
would  all consider  an  advantage. 
But  the political implications  would  also  be  great. 
We  must  be  frank  about  this.  The  relocation of monetary 
policy  to  the  European  level  would  be  as  big  a  political 
step  for  the  present  generation of  European  leaders  as  for 
the  last generation  in setting up  the  present  Community.  But 
we  must  face  the  fundamental  question.  Do  we  intend  to create 
a  European  union  or  do  we  not  ?  Do  we,  confronted with  the 
inevitable  and  indeed desirable  prospect  of  enlargement, 
intend  to  strengthen  and  deeperi  the  Community,  or  do  we  not  ? 
There  would  be  little point  in  asking  the  peoples  and  govern-
ments  of  Europe  to  contemplate  union,  were  it not  for  the 
fact  that  real  and  efficient  sovereignty  over  monetary 
issues  already  eludes  them  to  a  high  and  increasing 
degree.  The  prospect  of monetary  union  should  be  seen  as  part 
of  the  process  of recovering  the  substance  of  sovereign power. 
At  present  we  tend  to cling  to  its  shadow.  These  arguments 
do  not  run  against  international cooperation,  as  for  example 
in the  OECD  and  the  IHF.  On  the  contrary,  we  need  to  improve 
the  functioning  of  the  international  economy  by  a  better  shaping 
of  its constituent parts.  Monetary disunity  in  Europe  is  one  of 
the  major  flaws  in the  international  system  as  well  as  inthe 
functioning  of our  small  to  medium-sized  states. 
On  the  seventh  and  final  argument,  I  can  be  quite 
short  since,  like  the  first,  it is  a  traditional  one. 
It  is  the  straight political  argument  that  monetary  union 
stands  on  offer  as  a  vehicle  for  European  political  integration. 
Jacques  Rueff  said in  1949  "L'Europe  se  fera  par  la  monnaie 
I  ou  ne  se 
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ou  ne  se  fera  pas".  I  would  not  necessarily  be  quite  so 
categorical.  It  should,  however,  be  clear that  the 
successful  creation of  a  European  monetary  union  would 
take  Europe  over  a  political threshold.  It  seems  equally 
clear  that  Europe  today  is not  prepared  to  pursue  the  objective 
of monetary  union uniquely  for  ideological  reasons.  To  move 
in this direction Europe  also  needs  materially convincing  arguments. 
I  have  tried to  set  out  some  of  the  economic  arguments. 
I  summarise  as  follm~s.  We  must  change  the  way  we 
have  been  looking at  monetary  union.  A  few  years  ago  we  were 
looking  at  a  mountain  top  through  powerful  binoculars.  The 
summit  seemed  quite  close,  and  a  relatively accessible,  smooth 
gradual  and  short  approach was  marked  out.  But  then  an 
avalanche  occurred  and  swent  away  this  route.  The  shock 
was  such  that  more  recently it has  even  seemed  as  if we 
have  been  looking  at  the  summit  with  the  binoculars  both 
the wrong  way  round  and  out  of  focus. 
I  believe that  a  new,  more  compelling  and  rewarding 
but  still arduous  approach  is necessary.  We  must  also  change 
the metaphor.  Let  us  think of  a  long-jumper.  He  starts with 
a  rapid  succession of steps,  lengthens  his  stride,  increases 
his  momentum,  and  then makes  his  leap. 
The  creation of  a  monetary  union  would  he  a  lean  of 
this  kind.  Measures  to  improve  the  Customs  Union  and  the 
free  circulation of  goods,  services  and  nersons  arc  important 
steps.  We  look  for  bigger  strides  in working  out  external 
policies,  establishing more  democratic  and  thus  accountable 
institutions,  elaborating more  coherent  industrial  and 
regional policies,  and  giving  our  financial  instruments  the 
means  to  keep  the  whole  movement  on  a  balanced  course.  We 
have  to  look  before  we  leap,  and  know  when  we  are  to  land. 
But  leap  we  eventually must. 
We  must  not  only  do  what  is best  in  the  circumstances. 
We  must  give  our  people  an  aim  beyond  the  immediately possible. 
Politics is  not  only  the  art of  the possible,  but  as  Jean 
Monnet  said,  it is  also  the art of making  possible  tomorrow 
what  may  seem  impossible  today. 